Louis J Sheehan 110907.10964

Initial air attacks
Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo launched his initial attack wave of 108 aircraft at 04:30 on June 4. At the same time, he launched eight search aircraft (one 30 minutes late, and one which turned back), as well as combat air patrol (CAP) fighters.
Japanese reconnaissance arrangements were flimsy, with too few aircraft to adequately cover the assigned search areas, laboring under poor weather conditions to the northeast and east of the task force.[28] Now, Yamamoto's faulty dispositions came home to roost.[29]
At 06:20, Japanese carrier aircraft bombed and heavily damaged the U.S. base on Midway. Midway-based Marine fighter pilots, flying obsolescent Grumman F4F Wildcats and obsolete Brewster F2As, made a defense of Midway and suffered heavy losses. American anti-aircraft fire was accurate and intense, damaging many Japanese aircraft.[30] The Japanese mission recognized the island's strike aircraft had already departed. The Japanese strike leader signaled Nagumo another mission would be necessary to neutralize Midway's defenses before troops could be landed on June 7.[31]
Having taken off prior to the Japanese attack, American bombers based on Midway made several attacks on the Japanese carrier fleet. These included six TBF Avengers in their first combat operation, and four B-26 Marauders (armed with torpedoes). The Japanese shrugged off these attacks with almost no losses, while destroying all but three of the American bombers.[32]


Hiryu avoiding B-17 attack.
Admiral Nagumo, in accordance with Japanese carrier doctrine at the time, had kept half of his aircraft in reserve. These comprised two squadrons each of dive-bombers and torpedo bombers. The latter were armed with torpedoes for an antiship strike, should any American warships be located. The dive bombers were, as yet, unarmed.[33] As a result of the attacks from Midway, as well as the morning flight leader's recommendation regarding the need for a second strike, Nagumo at 07:15 ordered his reserve planes to be re-armed with general purpose contact bombs for use on land targets. This had been underway for about 30 minutes, when at 07:40 a scout plane from the cruiser Tone signaled the discovery of a sizable American naval force to the east. Nagumo quickly reversed his order and demanded the scout plane ascertain the composition of the American force. Another 40 minutes elapsed before Tone's scout finally detected and radioed the presence of a single carrier in the American force, TF 16 (the other carrier was not detected).
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Nagumo was now in a quandary. Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi, leading Carrier Division 2 (Hiryū and Sōryū), recommended Nagumo strike immediately with the forces at hand. Nagumo's seeming opportunity to hit the American ships,[35] however, was curtailed by the fact his Midway strike force would be returning shortly. They would be low on fuel and carrying wounded crewmen, would need to land promptly or ditch, losing precious aircraft and crews; there was slim chance a strike could be mounted in time. Spotting his flight decks and launching aircraft would require at least 30–45 minutes.[36] Furthermore, by spotting and launching immediately, he would be committing some of his reserve to battle without proper antiship armament, as well as without fighter escort; they had just witnessed how easily unescorted American bombers were shot down by their own fighters [37]. Japanese carrier doctrine preferred fully constituted strikes, and in the absence of a confirmation (until 08:20) of whether the American force contained carriers, Nagumo's reaction was cautious.[38] In addition, the impending arrival of another American air strike at 07:53 gave weight to the need to attack the island again. In the end, Nagumo chose to wait for his first strike force to land, then launch the reserve strike force, which would have by then been properly armed and ready.[39] In the final analysis, it made no difference; Fletcher had launched beginning at 07:00, so the aircraft which would deliver the crushing blow were already on their way. There was nothing Nagumo could do about it. This was, perhaps, the fatal flaw of Yamamoto's dispositions: it followed strictly traditional battleship doctrine.